Influenza Pandemic Vaccines: Spread Them Thin? by Fraser, Christophe
PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0977
Perspectives
June 2007  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 6  |  e228
T
he global spread of highly 
pathogenic H5N1 inﬂ  uenza 
through poultry ﬂ  ocks is 
driving a large research effort aimed 
at mitigating the worst effects of 
an eventual human pandemic. 
Mathematical models and computer 
simulations are being used to explore 
different policy options in inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic control (for examples, see 
[1–4]). In a new study published in 
PLoS Medicine, Riley, Wu, and Leung 
[5] use such exploratory modelling to 
tackle the thorny issue of what to do 
with limited stockpiles of pre-prepared 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic vaccines [5].
The Study’s Key Findings 
Several vaccines matched to circulating 
avian H5N1 strains are in development 
[6–8], one has already been licensed by 
the US Food and Drug Administration 
[8,9], and several more are in the 
pipeline. Vaccine stockpiles are being 
planned and amassed. The issue of 
what to do with these stockpiles has 
been the subject of intense discussion. 
Decisions need largely to be taken in 
advance because of the time needed 
for the vaccine to be distributed and 
to take effect after inoculation. Some 
governments (e.g., the US) have 
drafted speciﬁ  c plans to prioritize 
vaccination of those individuals who 
are crucial to controlling a pandemic 
(such as front-line medical staff or 
vaccine producers) or those who are 
at heightened risk of inﬂ  uenza-related 
complications (such as pregnant 
women or the elderly) [10]. 
Rather than trying to prioritise 
individuals by their clinical need or 
role in pandemic response, Riley et 
al. start instead from the premise that 
the vaccine may be considered as part 
of the armoury of tools available for 
pandemic mitigation [5]. They address 
the interesting question of how best 
to spread the vaccine throughout the 
population to reduce the total number 
of people infected in an eventual 
outbreak. They come to the (perhaps 
surprising) conclusion that, in the 
case of a limited stockpile, it is best to 
spread the vaccine thinly; i.e., that a low 
dose of vaccine given to many people 
is in many cases more effective than a 
large dose given to few. This approach 
is also known as antigen sparing (see 
Glossary).
Models Calibrated to Past 
Pandemics
The international effort to control 
or mitigate an eventual pandemic 
has been substantially boosted since 
2004 by the realisation that the three 
inﬂ  uenza pandemics of the twentieth 
century (1918, 1957, and 1968) 
were characterised by relatively low 
transmissibility, as measured by the basic 
reproduction number, R0 [1,2,11–19]. 
This number is an estimate of how 
many people a typical case infects over 
his or her infectious period, and has 
been estimated to lie between 1.5 and 
4 for all three pandemics. There are 
subtleties in the estimation of R0, such 
as a reliance on good estimates of the 
infection generation time distribution 
[12], and on aggregated city-wide 
data (except for [15], in which R0 is 
estimated in a military camp outbreak). 
It is worth appreciating these subtleties, 
as so much of what is predicted in 
simulation scenarios depends on R0. 
Analysing records from historical 
pandemics should continue to be a 
priority. Figure 1 gives a simple example 
of how the same intervention could have 
drastically different effects in epidemics 
characterised by different R0. 
Key to understanding this 
dependency is the notion of herd 
effect: by vaccinating an individual, 
not only is that person protected, but 
his or her contacts are also at reduced 
risk of infection. This herd effect is 
also seen with antiviral treatment, 
prophylaxis, social isolation, or 
indeed any intervention that reduces 
transmission. Based on estimates of 
R0 for past epidemics, this herd effect 
could be very large. Consider, for 
example, effectively vaccinating 10% of 
individuals against an epidemic disease 
with R0 = 1.5. Figure 1 predicts that the 
ﬁ  nal attack rate (i.e., the total number 
who get inﬂ  uenza) amongst those not 
protected by the vaccine would be 
reduced from 58% to 47%; i.e., in this 
case there would be nearly as many 
people protected indirectly by the 
herd effect as directly by the vaccine. 
One proposal aimed at maximizing the 
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Linked Research Article 
This Perspective discusses the 
following new study published in PLoS 
Medicine:
Riley S, Wu TJ, Leung GM (2007) 
Optimizing the dose of pre-pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines to reduce the 
infection attack rate. PLoS Med 4: e218. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218
Steven Riley and colleagues examine 
the potential beneﬁ  ts of “stretching” a 
limited supply of vaccine and suggest 
that substantial reductions in the attack 
rate are possible if vaccines are given to 
more people at lower doses.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0978
herd effect for inﬂ  uenza is to prioritize 
vaccination of children (who are the 
most infectious group) over the elderly 
(who are among those most at risk 
of complications) [20], an approach 
considered by Riley et al. [5] (with 
mixed conclusions). 
A fundamental issue with attempting 
to maximize the herd effect is that 
whereas the direct effects can be 
targeted at individuals, the herd 
effect protects more randomly. Some 
people may be uncomfortable with 
approaches, such as those suggested 
by Riley et al. [5], that trade losses in 
direct vaccine efﬁ  cacy in those targeted 
for collective gains in overall reduced 
attack rate. 
Limitations of the Study and 
Challenges for Future Research 
Riley and colleagues’ results are quite 
dependent on the assumed nature of 
immunity, and they consider a number 
of different possible immunological 
assumptions. In the ﬁ  rst case they 
assume that for any given dose, a 
proportion of vaccine recipients 
are fully protected and the rest not 
at all (an all-or-nothing response). 
In this case it is possible to explain 
the study results quite simply. The 
number protected is made greater by 
vaccinating more people with a lower 
dose. This conclusion is, of course, 
heavily dependent on the relation 
between antibody titre and immune 
response; for example, if there was a 
threshold below which a dose gave no 
protection at all, there would be no 
sense in vaccinating below that titre. 
If, on the other hand, vaccination 
induces more homogenous partial 
protection, the situation is more 
complex. The herd effect needs to 
be fully accounted for and is strongly 
dependent on R0, which they take to 
be 1.8. Some may take comfort from 
the consistency of estimates of R0 for 
the past three pandemics, but the 
dependence of Riley and colleagues’ 
results on their assumed value of R0 is 
not the only issue here. The circulating 
virus will not be the currently known 
avian H5N1, but rather a newly human-
adapted strain, and the match between 
vaccines based on an avian virus 
and one based on a human-adapted 
pandemic strain are unknown. The 
authors address the dependence of 
their model on the potential mismatch 
partially, and the data needed to 
characterise this match could be 
collected quickly when a new virus is 
identiﬁ  ed. 
In the most pessimistic scenario, the 
available vaccines might provide only 
partial protection even with high doses, 
and any dilution would further reduce 
individual protection with little or no 
compensation from increased herd 
immunity.
A fundamental problem the authors 
had was that, while data on induced 
haemagglutinin titres are widely 
available for candidate vaccines, the 
relation between these titres and actual 
protection has been poorly studied. 
Riley et al. resorted to using some 
human challenge studies from the 
1970s to calibrate their models, but 
these studies have their limitations. 
There is no guarantee that the relation 
between haemagglutinin titre and 
protection is universal.  
What to Do With the Results?
Mathematical models and computer 
simulations are not crystal balls, but 
rather tools that allow questions to be 
precisely deﬁ  ned, assumptions to be 
made clear, and logical deductions to 
be performed. So construed, they can 
contribute a great deal to the policy 
debate.
Thus, in this light, this study offers 
some important points of discussion 
and action. The numbers provided 
by Riley et al. should perhaps not 
be seen as predictions, but rather 
examples based on extrapolating from 
Glossary
Antigen sparing: Reducing the dose 
administered in order to vaccinate more 
people. A general concept that includes 
dose-reducing strategies such as the 
one considered here, as well as use of an 
adjuvant or alternative vaccine delivery 
methods to boost the immune response 
for a given dose.
R0: Basic reproduction number, the 
number of people infected by a 
typical case during an exponentially 
growing epidemic. A key measure of 
transmissibility.
Generation time distribution: The 
distribution of time intervals between 
being infected and infecting others.
Herd effect: The indirect effect of 
interventions against infectious diseases 
in which people not targeted by the 
interventions are protected by breaks in 
the chains of transmission. 
Epidemiological synergy: The 
phenomenon in which combined 
interventions to reduce infectious disease 
transmission achieve more than the 
sum of the effect of each intervention 
implemented alone. Linked to the herd 
effect.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040228.g001
Figure 1. How the Efﬁ  cacy of Interventions That Limit Transmission Depends on the Basic 
Reproduction Number, R0
The ﬁ  nal proportion infected in a pandemic for a general class of models with homogeneous 
population mixing is plotted as a function of R0 [22,23]. The arrows highlight the effect of an 
intervention that reduces transmission by 20% for three different baseline values of R0. This curve 
can be used, for example, to predict the effect of a vaccine that directly protects 20% of individuals 
on those who are not directly protected. In scenario I, R0 is 5 and the intervention reduces the 
attack rate by 1.3%. In scenario II, R0 is 3 and the reduction is 6.2%. In scenario III, R0 is 1.5 and the 
reduction is 26.9%. 
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past pandemics used to illustrate the 
potential for antigen sparing. The 
magnitude of reduction in attack 
rate that the authors discuss in their 
models is quite modest (from 0% to 
20%), but this still represents many 
infections prevented. However—and 
here the authors may have been overly 
conservative—when added to the other 
interventions that would likely be 
carried out, the potential herd effect 
would grow, and the reductions in 
attack rate would be greater because of 
epidemiological synergy.
More work clearly needs to go into 
establishing the quantitative correlates 
of immunity for inﬂ  uenza, which 
cannot easily be done for pandemic 
virus strains. Nevertheless, good 
data for different strains of seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza could go a long way. Not 
only do we need cross-immunity tables 
for vaccines and virus strains, but 
also studies that correlate different 
measures of the immune response to 
actual protection from infection. These 
data could be derived from challenge 
experiments or household secondary 
attack rate studies; the latter could also 
be used to determine potential effects 
of vaccination on infectiousness, as 
has been done for antiviral drugs [21]. 
Such data would help to make more 
sense of the studies of cross-reactivity 
between vaccine and pandemic strain 
that would inevitably be carried out 
in the ﬁ  rst few weeks of an emerging 
pandemic. The data would allow these 
and other related analyses to be rapidly 
revised as necessary.
Most importantly, some reﬂ  ection 
is needed on the real aims of pre-
pandemic vaccination: is the aim to 
minimise the overall attack rate or to 
protect speciﬁ  c individuals or groups? 
We must also consider whether anyone 
is ready for the potential consequences 
of deploying a suboptimal vaccine 
in an uncertain attempt to maximise 
our herd protection, with a possible 
reduction in the extent of protection of 
individuals. 
Some may feel that publishing this 
work about vaccines with unknown 
antigenicity elicited against an 
unknown virus is jumping the gun. The 
most important aspect of Riley et al.’s 
paper is that it brings forward a new, 
interesting concept for wider discussion 
in the public domain.  
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